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KHMER ROUGE: 
EVOLUTION OF THE ACADEMIC DEBATE 
 
 
 On April 7, 1975, Khmer Rouge revolutionary forces invaded and took control of the 
capital city of Phnom Penh, Cambodia.  The Khmer Rouge regime remained in power for the 
next four years, causing destruction, violence, torture, and death to devastate the citizens of 
Cambodia.  Since the revolution, the intentions, motives, and appropriate process of justice 
regarding the actions of the Khmer Rouge have been the subject of contentious debate among 
academic scholars.  This paper will evaluate the evolution of this debate over the last thirty years, 
considering how and why the views of various scholars have changed or remained the same and 
how these views have often conflicted with one another. I will argue that from 1975 to 2009, 
academic scholars have selected various types of evidence to reach different conclusions about 
the events of the Khmer Rouge, primarily as a result of their own perceptions of the political 
situation of Indochina during this time, as well as their willingness to admit that the Khmer 
Rouge revolution was not improving the situation of Cambodia. 
1 
On April 7, 1975, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), under the leadership of 
Pol Pot, took control of Cambodia’s capital city, Phnom Penh.  Although many residents of 
Phnom Penh cheered, they were grossly unaware of the violence, torture, destruction and death 
that were to follow over the course of the next four years.  Immediately, Khmer Rouge forces 
removed all aspects of Lon Nol’s previous regime—all private property was seized, laws and 
religion were abolished, markets and currency disappeared, public spaces were closed, and any 
opposition to the new regime was considered treasonous.1  The borders of Cambodia, which was 
then called Democratic Kampuchea, were closed; thus no outsiders were allowed in and no 
Cambodians were allowed out.2  Then, large cities such as Phnom Penh, Pursat and Battambang 
were promptly evacuated, forcing millions of civilians into the countryside to begin strenuous 
forced labor under gruesome working conditions.3 
Throughout this process of returning Cambodia to “primitive communism,” or an 
agrarian state, Pol Pot ordered the systematic elimination of a number of different ethnic, 
religious and political groups who inhabited Democratic Kampuchea, including the Muslim 
Cham, Buddhist monks, Vietnamese, Thai, and even some ethnic Khmer.4  As a result, from 
1975 to 1979, it is estimated that Khmer Rouge forces directly or indirectly contributed to the 
deaths of more than one million Cambodians and also led to the exile of roughly half a million 
Cambodians to Thailand and other parts of the world.5 
Despite obvious devastation, the events, intentions, motives, and appropriate process of 
justice regarding the actions of the Khmer Rouge have long been the subjects of contentious 
                                                 
1
 David Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot (Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 1. 
2
 Ben Kiernan, “The Cambodian Genocide 1975-1979,” in A Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness 
Accounts, ed. Samuel Trotten and William S. Parsons, 283-313 (New York: Routledge, 2009), 285. 
3
 Chandler, Brother Number One, 1. 
4
 Henri Locard, “State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) and Retribution (1979-2004),” European 
Review of History 12, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 127. 
5
 David Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991), 1. 
2 
debates among academic scholars.  This paper will evaluate the evolution of this debate over 
roughly the last thirty years, considering how and why the views of various scholars have 
changed or remained the same and also how these views have often conflicted with one another.  
I will argue that from 1975 to 2009, academic scholars have selected various types of evidence to 
reach different conclusions about the events of the Khmer Rouge, primarily as a result of their 
own perceptions of the political situation of Indochina during this time, as well as their 
willingness to admit that the Khmer Rouge revolution was not improving the situation of 
Cambodia. 
 Academic scholars have expressed both similar and opposing viewpoints by means of 
books, journal and newspaper articles, and even private correspondence letters between one 
another.  These books and articles use carefully selected evidence to help convey an author’s 
personal opinions and conclusions, while at the same time often disputing the ideas of other 
scholars.  Consequently, depending on a scholar’s position, the evidence they use to support their 
conclusions generally varies.   
Scholars who criticize the Khmer Rouge tend to support their conclusions using first-
hand accounts of survivors and witnesses, which convey the idea that the regime was committing 
horrific crimes against the innocent and helpless people of Cambodia.  Because these accounts 
were only available once the violence had already begun, many of the scholars who use this 
evidence were initial supporters of the Khmer Rouge.  However, as soon as overwhelming 
amounts of this evidence began to surface, it became apparent that the regime was not working 
to improve the situation of Cambodia.  Therefore, by using these first-hand accounts, scholars 
are able to substantiate the argument that brutality did occur at the hands of the Khmer Rouge, 
and as a result, civilians in Cambodia were either directly or indirectly affected.  
3 
On the other hand, scholars who sympathize with or support the Khmer Rouge generally 
defend the regime’s innocence by using data and/or statements that were carefully constructed by 
its members.  Since the Khmer Rouge did not want the public to become aware of its hidden 
agenda, most of this information suggests that there was little to no unnecessary brutality 
imposed on the citizens of Cambodia and that the regime’s actions did not cause civilians to 
suffer.  Furthermore, a handful of these scholars then tend to blame entities outside of Cambodia, 
such as the international media and foreign governments, for their untruthful portrayal of the 
regime’s cruelty.  As a result, the international public formed unfavorable perceptions of the 
Khmer Rouge, which were based off of alleged distortions, exaggerations, and lies.  To dispute 
the strong arguments associated with scholars who use first-hand accounts, scholars supportive 
of the Khmer Rouge tend to explain that survivor stories are historically embellished and often 
untrue, and therefore this evidence is baseless and unconfirmed. 
In summary, the conclusions that an author reaches are highly correlated to the evidence 
and sources that they use to support them.  Since these conclusions are generally only based on 
one particular type of evidence—first-hand survivor accounts or Khmer Rouge reports—it was 
important to avoid being misled or misinformed by such opposite findings.  Therefore, it was 
important to weigh both sides of each argument, address the biases of each scholar, and also 
examine the evidence each scholar used to support their conclusion. 
History of Cambodia 
Geographically, Cambodia is located between Vietnam and Thailand, two countries that 
have fought for power and control of the Cambodian territory since the middle of the eighteenth 
century.6  During these years, Cambodia was often a protectorate of either Vietnam or Thailand, 
which forced Cambodia to cede some of its territory to these countries, and also caused 
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instability within Cambodia.7  By 1816, Cambodia had been forced to pay tribute to both 
Vietnam and Thailand.  Then, in 1833, Vietnam drove Thailand out of Cambodia, leaving 
Vietnam as Cambodia’s sole protectorate.  Vietnam immediately began to impose their ways on 
Cambodia, which did not sit well with the Cambodian people.  This produced a series of revolts 
against the Vietnamese, which eventually became strong enough to force them out of Cambodia.  
As soon as this happened, Thailand once again moved in.  The Vietnamese then began fighting 
with the Thai until they were able to negotiate a peace agreement in 1846.  This agreement 
stipulated that both countries would withdraw from Cambodia and recognize Ang Duong, a 
Cambodian, as king.8  It was during this period, however, that France had a growing desire to 
begin colonizing areas of Southeast Asia.   
The French Revolution of 1789 ignited the birth of nationalism and the desire for French 
conquest.  In the years following the French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte led France on a 
series of wars of conquest to expand his empire.  France’s colonizing mission, or mission 
civilisatrice, was finally successful in Southeast Asia in 1863, when they formally colonized 
Cochinchina, Tonkin, Annam, and Cambodia, also known as the region of Indochina.9   
There are several reasons that Cambodia was susceptible to colonization by the French.  
In 1860, Ang Duong died and Norodom came to power, although Norodom was not officially 
declared king at this time.  During his rule, Norodom accepted gifts from the French and 
eventually signed an agreement that made Cambodia a tributary state of France.  Shortly after 
signing this agreement, Norodom went to Thailand to finally be crowned king.  When he did 
this, the French moved in and erected their flag at Cambodia’s capital, although Norodom soon 
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returned and they were forced to take it down for the time being.  Long-lasting French control, 
however, was in Cambodia’s near future.10  Even though Cambodia initially welcomed the 
French, they soon began resisting their reform efforts, just as they had with Vietnam decades 
earlier.  Despite this resistance, the French eventually took control of Cambodia and remained in 
power until the 1930s.11 
During this period of steady imperialism and colonization, the world was undergoing 
massive changes. World War II (1939-1945) was occurring on numerous different fronts 
throughout the world, which had a significant impact on Cambodia.  During World War II, 
Cambodia was still a French protectorate, but Japan was beginning to assert themselves and their 
expanding empire into the region of Southeast Asia.  In 1940, France granted Japan permission 
to station their military in Indochina during the war, although France established that the French 
would still maintain control over the region.  During this time, however, Japan worked to weaken 
French control, and eventually succeeded.   
On March 9, 1945, the Japanese executed their coup de force, which placed many French 
colonists in Indochina under arrest and drove the remainder out of the region.  Consequently, this 
caused the French to lose their control over Indochina for the time being.12  The Japanese then 
began to encourage the states of Indochina to push for their independence.  Finally, during the 
summer of 1945, Japan granted Cambodia their independence, which had a significant impact on 
the formation of a new political ideology of many Cambodians in the years to come.  This 
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ideology was based on movements for independence and individuality, rather than inferiority and 
subordination.13 
A short time later, the French returned to Indochina.  In 1946, the French signed an 
agreement with Cambodia, which stated that Cambodia could form a constitution and political 
parties.  Through this process, a leading faction that rose to power was the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea (CPK), assembled by Vietnamese-speaking Khmer and later joined by Pol Pot and 
his followers.14  The CPK consisted of many young Cambodians, such as Saloth Sar (Pol Pot), 
Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and others.  Most came from wealthy families and were sent to 
France to study in their early years.  In France, these young men and women learned many 
radical ideas, which they brought back to Cambodia.  This group then became known as the 
“radical generation of Cambodians.”15   
By 1953, many of these young Cambodians began returning to Cambodia and fighting for 
independence.  During this time, France was heavily involved in the First Indochina War, which 
primarily took place in Vietnam, but used much of France’s power and resources.  Faced with 
increasing resistance in Cambodia, France finally “caved,” granting the country independence 
and allowing Cambodia’s Prince Sihanouk to control the country’s armed forces, judiciary, and 
foreign affairs.16  Finally, in Vietnam in 1954, France lost a defining battle at Dienbienphu.  
After this crucial loss, the French were out of resources and could not continue with the war.  
France then conceded to signing the Geneva Agreement, which stipulated that they would finally 
withdraw all of their forces form Indochina, including Cambodia.17 
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A final war that was occurring during this time was the American War in Vietnam (1946-
1975).  This war began as a primary result of an American fear of Communism, particularly of 
Mao Zedong’s Communist China.  This fear carried over to Vietnam when the U.S. government 
began associating Mao’s communists with those led by Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam.  During this 
war, the United States began both an aerial bombardment and ground war with Vietnam to fight 
this Communism, although they were met with fierce resistance from the Vietnamese 
communists.  Although Vietnam and Cambodia were separate countries at this time, they were 
neighbors.  As a result, the violence in Vietnam significantly crossed the borders into Cambodia.  
This is because Vietnam’s supply lines ran north and south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which 
went straight through Cambodia.  The United States specifically bombed these supply lines to 
create a disadvantage for the Vietnamese.18 
While the U.S. was fighting Communism in neighboring Vietnam, Communist factions in 
Cambodia were rapidly growing in popularity.  The main leader of these Cambodian 
Communists was Pol Pot, who was formerly known as Saloth Sar.19  Saloth Sar, was born into a 
wealthy family and began his schooling at a Catholic school in Phnom Penh.  He was then given 
a scholarship to study in France, where he learned about imperialism, revolution, and even 
Marxist-Leninism.20  In 1952, it is believed that he even joined the French Communist Party, 
although he failed their exams and returned to Cambodia the following year.21  Aside from 
taking ideas from the French Communists, Saloth Sar also learned many ideas from Mao 
Zedong, the radical Communist leader of China who was also a personal friend.  When Saloth 
Sar visited China in 1953, he was especially interested in Mao’s ideas about class struggles, the 
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cleansing of political opposition, and revolution.22  Therefore, when he finally returned to 
Cambodia, he was beginning to plan for a Communist revolution of his own. 
In 1963, Saloth Sar became secretary of the CPK.  He worked as secretary until he took 
control of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975 and began his rise to power in Cambodia.23  It was not 
until an election announcement in 1976 that Saloth Sar became known to the people of 
Cambodia as “Pol Pot;” before this time, his identity was largely unknown to the public.24  Pol 
Pot remained in power for nearly four years, ordering the destruction that resulted in the killings 
of roughly a quarter of the population of Cambodia.25 
Pol Pot and his followers, known as the Khmer Rouge, ruled Cambodia for nearly four 
years.  First, Pol Pot eradicated all aspects of Lon Nol’s previous regime: all private property was 
seized, laws and religion were abolished, markets and currency disappeared, public spaces were 
closed, and any opposition to the new regime was considered treasonous.26  Second, the borders 
of Cambodia were closed, not allowing outsiders in or Cambodians out.27  Then, cities such as 
Phnom Penh, Pursat and Battambang were promptly evacuated, displacing millions of 
Cambodians and forcing them to the countryside to begin forced labor.28  The entire process of 
this Khmer Rouge “revolution” was extremely brutal and violent. 
Finally, the Vietnamese invaded in 1979, forcing Pol Pot to leave Phnom Penh.  
Although he was no longer in the capital city, Pol Pot was still a significant threat and continued 
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to give orders to his Khmer Rouge cadres.29  Pol Pot eventually moved to Thailand and China, 
but returned to Cambodia in 1989 when Vietnamese forces left.  He remained in Cambodia until 
April 15, 1998, when he died of natural causes.30  
Khmer Rouge Criticisms  
 Over the course of the nearly four years that the Khmer Rouge terrorized Cambodia, 
several prominent academic scholars supported the regime and some even argued for their 
innocence.  Many of these scholars, however, later retracted this support as evidence in contrast 
to their beliefs began to surface.  First, David Chandler, a leading scholar on Cambodia, briefly 
supported the Khmer Rouge because he wanted to give the regime a chance to finally return 
Cambodia to the prominence it held several centuries prior.  In his article “Transformation in 
Cambodia,” Chandler explains his previous view: “In 1976, autarky makes sense, both in terms 
of recent experience—American intervention, and what is seen as Western-induced corruption of 
previous regimes—and in terms of Cambodia’s long history of conflict with Vietnam.”31   
It became evident to Chandler that the Khmer Rouge did not go about this process of 
returning Cambodia to prominence in the correct manner, as evidence began surfacing of mass 
evacuations, labor camps, torture, starvation, and death, all of which were unnecessary.32  As a 
result, Chandler changed his views and began writing texts criticizing the Khmer Rouge and 
their ideology.  These texts include a well-known history of Cambodia, an analysis of Pol Pot, 
and discussions of how the Khmer Rouge was able to come to power based on Cambodia’s 
history. 
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Ben Kiernan, a history professor and also the current director of Yale University’s 
Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP), also initially supported the Khmer Rouge.  This support 
stemmed from Kiernan’s initial fascination with the regime’s socialist ideology, as he was 
“sympathetic to their purported reforms and nationalism.”33  However, in 1978, Kiernan began 
the process of interviewing roughly five hundred Khmer Rouge refugees who detailed the horror 
they endured during the Khmer Rouge’s reign.  Throughout these interviews, the destruction, 
violence, and crimes that occurred in Cambodia began to become a reality to Kiernan.34   
One year later, in 1979, Kiernan issued a public apology in the Bulletin of Concerned 
Asian Scholars, titled “Vietnam and the Governments and Peoples of Kampuchea.”   In this 
apology, Kiernan retracted his early support for the Khmer Rouge, stating “there can be no 
doubting that the evidence also points clearly to a systematic use of violence against the 
population by that chauvinist section of the revolutionary movement that was led by Pol Pot.”35  
He states that at first, he believed that the Khmer Rouge was doing what they believed was best 
for Cambodia, although it later became evident that this certainly was not the case.  As a result, 
Kiernan admits that he grossly underestimated the amount of violence that was used to 
implement the socialist ideology of the Khmer Rouge, and therefore he would no longer support 
any aspects of the regime.36   
As stated above, Kiernan is currently the director of Yale University’s CGP; however, his 
important position in this program remains controversial to some as a result of his previous 
support for the Khmer Rouge.  Two scholars who remain skeptical of Kiernan and the CGP are 
Stephen Morris and Nancy deWolf Smith.  Morris and Smith both argue that because Kiernan 
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previously supported the regime, it is inevitable that he is still a Khmer Rouge sympathizer, 
despite the apology he made.   
In his article, “The Wrong Man to Investigate Cambodia,” Morris explains that Kiernan 
supported Pol Pot’s revolution and was “confidently predicting a wonderful future for Cambodia 
under the Khmer Rouge.”37  Until his apology, Kiernan allegedly disputed the horror stories told 
by Khmer Rouge refugees and widely circulated by the Western press, claiming that the press 
was more interested in the “bloodbath” in Cambodia than was necessary.38  Although Kiernan 
did eventually apologize for his early Khmer Rouge support, Morris argues that he still supports 
a remaining faction of Pol Pot’s regime because some currently maintain power in the 
Cambodian government.  Therefore, because Kiernan still supports officials associated with the 
Khmer Rouge, he does not completely deny their ideology, and despite his apology, still supports 
the regime.  Finally, considering Kiernan’s early transgressions in Cambodia, Morris is confused 
as to why Kiernan was picked to run the CGP, which was setup to ultimately bring the Khmer 
Rouge to justice.39  
Like Morris, in her article “America’s Cambodian Coda,” Nancy deWolf Smith raises 
similar questions about Ben Kiernan.  Smith agrees that due to Kiernan’s alleged questionable 
views, he should not be the director of the CGP, which is given federal funding by the U.S. 
Department of State to conduct research to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice.  Furthermore, the 
program should no longer receive this federal funding because Kiernan has refused to disclose 
several of the program’s valuable findings to the U.S. government.  For example, Smith cites it 
has been suspected that some of the CGP’s research could possibly contain valuable information 
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regarding the location of missing U.S. soldiers, or prisoners of war, in Cambodia.40  However, in 
a subsequent letter to the Wall Street Journal, Kiernan criticized Smith’s article, arguing that the 
CGP did in fact give the U.S. government the relevant information and documents regarding 
those missing persons and also allowed them access to their research archives as was asked.41 
John Barron and Anthony Paul are two American scholars who also inititally supported 
the Khmer Rouge, as they wanted to give the regime a chance to finally help Cambodia flourish.  
Again, this support was short-lived as survivor stories suggesting its brutality began to surface.  
Barron and Paul co-authored Murder of a Gentle Land: The Untold Story of a Communist 
Genocide in Cambodia, which alleges that the Khmer Rouge committed genocide, killing more 
than one million Cambodians during their reign.42  This book can be considered Barron and 
Paul’s ultimate apology to the Cambodian people, as the authors finally admitted that what 
happened from 1975 to 1979 was indeed horrific and undoubtedly real.  Their evidence is 
derived from analyzing more than three hundred refugee and witness reports of Khmer Rouge 
brutality.  Using this information, Barron and Paul describe in detail the evacuations, executions, 
and also the slow process of death that many Cambodians endured due to starvation, disease, and 
exhaustion.43 
Much like Barron and Paul, Francois Ponchaud also once supported the Khmer Rouge, as 
he believed that their rise to power would improve the already dismal conditions of Cambodia.  
This support was short-lived once he became aware of credible accounts of civilian suffering and 
brutality.  Ponchaud was a French Roman Catholic priest who lived in Cambodia from 1965 until 
the fall of Phnom Penh in 1975, when he was forced to leave.  During his stay in Cambodia, 
                                                 
40
 Nancy deWolf Smith, “America’s Cambodian Coda,” The Wall Street Journal, December 19, 1996. 
41
 Ben Kiernan, “Malicious Falsehoods,” The Wall Street Journal, December 19, 1996. 
42
 John Barron and Anthony Paul, Murder of a Gentle Land: The Untold Story of a Communist Genocide in 
Cambodia (New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1977): 206. 
43
 Ibid., 206. 
13
 
Ponchaud witnessed and even originally supported the rise of the CPK, although he did not 
predict the violence that would be associated with this party in the years to come.  While living 
in Cambodia, Ponchaud learned the Khmer language and was able to make numerous friends and 
connections among the Cambodian people.  Many of these friends and acquaintances then helped 
Ponchaud put together his book Cambodia: Year Zero, which was originally published in French 
in 1977.  In this book, Ponchaud focuses primarily on first-hand accounts of witnesses and 
victims of the Khmer Rouge and also on radio reports that he heard while he was living in 
Cambodia.  Ponchaud details the mass killings and war crimes that plagued Cambodia from the 
perspectives of many of the people he met during his stay.44  Much like Barron and Paul, hearing 
these survivor stories from his trusted friends helped Ponchaud to denounce the Khmer Rouge 
regime and their horrific actions. 
A final scholar who switched sides to eventually criticize the Khmer Rouge is Jean 
Lacouture, a French socialist and expert scholar on Indochina.  Originally, Lacouture supported 
the idea of a socialist revolution by the Cambodian people, as he believed it would be in the 
country’s best interest.  Lacouture withdrew this support after reading Francois Ponchaud’s 
book, Cambodia: Year Zero, which undoubtedly proved, using credible first-hand accounts, that 
the Khmer Rouge’s mass killings were a reality.  Lacouture then wrote a favorable review of 
Cambodia: Year Zero, titled “The Bloodiest Revolution,” although there were some major 
discrepancies of facts between the two texts.  These discrepancies then ignited an intense debate, 
which I will discuss in the following section, between Lacouture and Noam Chomsky and 
Edward S. Herman.  
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In “The Bloodiest Revolution,” which can also be considered Lacouture’s apology for 
initially supporting the Khmer Rouge, he admits to his earlier flawed judgments in siding with 
the regime, explains the differences of facts between him and Ponchaud, and finally affirms that 
“it is not only because I once argued for the victory of [the Khmer Rouge regime], and feel 
myself partially guilty for what is happening under it, that I believe I can say: there is a time, 
when a great crime is taking place, when it is better to speak out, in whatever company, than to 
remain silent.”45 
Khmer Rouge Support 
In contrast to the majority of academia, a final group of scholars continues to support or 
sympathize with the Khmer Rouge for various different reasons.  Noam Chomsky and Edward S. 
Herman, both fervent anti-war activists during the American War in Vietnam, have disputed the 
positions of numerous scholars over the last thirty years.  Both scholars believe that Cambodia 
became “the third victim of U.S. aggression and savagery in Indochina.”46  In their article 
“Distortions at Fourth Hand,” Chomsky and Herman write about what they consider the 
exaggeration and lies of the U.S. media throughout the Vietnam War era, specifically in regards 
to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.  According to Chomsky and Herman, rather than exposing the 
truth, the U.S. media withholds and/or “distorts” any information suggesting that the U.S. played 
a role in the destruction of Cambodia and the rest of Indochina.47  In addition, the U.S. media 
also withholds information that would expose the many U.S. failures in Indochina, as this 
information is “unpalatable” to the public.48  Why and how is the U.S. media able to accomplish 
                                                 
45
 Jean Lacouture, “Cambodia: Corrections,” New York Review of Books, May 26, 1977. 
46
 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of 
Imperial Ideology (Cambridge: South End Press, 1979), 135. 
47
 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, “Distortions at Fourth Hand,” The Nation, June 25, 1977. 
48
 Ibid. 
15
 
this?  According to Chomsky and Herman, the answer is “freedom of the press.”49  With freedom 
of the press, “all are free to write what they wish,” so they can manipulate, exaggerate, and even 
lie about some stories to make them newsworthy and acceptable to the public.50 
 Two years later in their book, After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the 
Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology, Chomsky and Herman further their argument that the U.S. 
media supplies an unfavorable and untruthful portrayal of Indochina during the post-Vietnam 
war years from 1975 to 1978.  For example, they deny that the Khmer Rouge is at fault for the 
mass killings that occurred: “The deaths in Cambodia were not the result of systematic slaughter 
and starvation organized by the state, but rather attributable…to peasant revenge, undisciplined 
military units out of government control, starvation and disease that are direct consequences of 
the U.S. war, or other such factors.”51  They explain that citizens of countries such as the U.S. 
began forming negative perceptions of the Khmer Rouge, which were not based on accurate 
facts, because the “U.S. role and responsibility ha[s] been explicitly denied as the mills of the 
propaganda machine grind away.”52   
According to Chomsky and Herman, the U.S. media has worked tirelessly to blame the 
region of Indochina for their own problems, while at the same time revealing that Communism is 
at the core of these problems.  Therefore, U.S. attacks on Indochina can be attributed to their 
leanings toward the “evils of Communism.”53  Then, after being attacked by the U.S., the 
countries of Indochina, especially Cambodia, were forced to restore and rebuild their countries 
and the lives of their citizens.  Chomsky and Herman do not deny the fact that in Cambodia, Pol 
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Pot rose to power and “undertook drastic and often brutal measures to accomplish this task.”54  
However, rather than arguing that Pol Pot’s actions further deconstructed and brutalized the 
population of Cambodia, they assert that Pol Pot helped them to “overcome the dire and 
destructive consequences of the U.S. war.”55 
As previously mentioned, Chomsky and Herman have debated the positions of numerous 
scholars over the last thirty years.  One of the most prominent of these debates involves Jean 
Lacouture.  This debate was ignited when Lacouture wrote “The Bloodiest Revolution,” a 
favorable review of Francois Ponchaud’s book, Cambodia: Year Zero.  In his review, Lacouture 
acknowledges Ponchaud’s first-hand accounts as reliable and believable, although there is a 
noticeable divergence in facts between the two texts.  For example, Lacouture states that the 
death toll is probably closer to two million, a number significantly more than the one million 
originally presented by Ponchaud.56  As a result of these differences, Chomsky and Herman 
criticize Lacouture, deeming his review irrelevant and unsupported. 
Chomsky and Herman also criticize Lacouture because he “alleges that Ponchaud has 
revealed a policy of ‘auto-genocide’ (Lacouture’s word) practiced by the Communists.”57  
Chomsky and Herman, on the other hand, do not admit that any crimes were committed against 
the citizens of Cambodia.  Instead, they state that they are unsure of the actual truth because 
survivor stories and media reports are often exaggerated and cannot be substantiated.  Therefore, 
they argue that because the facts of the Khmer Rouge are highly controversial, it is unnecessary 
to expose the international public to this uncertain information.58 
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Suprisingly, Chomsky and Herman both agree that Ponchaud’s book is “serious and 
worth reading,” despite the fact that is filled with errors and inconsistencies.59  For example, 
Chomsky and Herman argue that the ability of witnesses and victims of the Khmer Rouge to 
truthfully and reliably relay their stories to Ponchaud is impossible, as “refugees are frightened 
and defenseless,” and “tend to report what their interlocuters want to hear.”60  These alleged 
errors only fueled Chomsky and Herman’s proposal that scholars, as well as the media, were 
trying to recreate and exaggerate the events of brutality that occurred in Cambodia from 1975 to 
1979 to criticize the Khmer Rouge. 
Ponchaud fired back at Chomsky and Herman for stating that his book was full of 
exaggerated and fabricated stories that were allegedly used by the U.S. media to even further 
amplify the destruction of Cambodia to the American public.  Ponchaud explains that in 
interviewing many of his sources, he methodically evaluated their situation in order to determine 
their reliability.  Second, Ponchaud makes it clear that he was “mainly interested in the ordinary 
people…who could neither read nor write nor analyze what they had seen [because] those 
illiterate memories could supply exact details.”61  As a result, Ponchaud’s evidence was 
legitimate and explained the truth of the events of the Khmer Rouge through the eyes of 
survivors and witnesses.  
Malcolm Caldwell, a Marxist scholar who worked at the University of London, was a 
known and fervent supporter of the Khmer Rouge until his murder by Khmer Rouge forces in 
December of 1978.62  On the day of his murder, Caldwell met Pol Pot for the first time and had 
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dinner with him.  Later that night, Caldwell was shot by a “heavily armed” member of the 
regime.63  The details of his murder, however, are widely unknown.64   
Although many of the abovementioned scholars readily changed their perceptions of the 
Khmer Rouge due to the emergence of reliable information regarding their actions, the history of 
Caldwell’s relentless support suggests that he would not have fallen into this category of 
scholars.  Caldwell’s main argument for supporting the revolution was that drastic changes were 
absolutely necessary for the survival of Cambodia.65  In his article, “Revolutionary Violence in a 
People’s War,” Caldwell focuses on the idea that a revolution was necessary in Cambodia, which 
was acceptable because there was an “avoidance of violence against the people by the liberation 
forces.”66  Furthermore, if the civilians did not support the revolution, they could have easily 
turned on the regime by rising up against the outnumbered Khmer Rouge forces: “guerillas 
waging people’s war cannot survive without the support, willingly given, of the people.”67  
Because civilians did not rise against the regime, Caldwell argues that the Khmer Rouge had the 
full support of Cambodians, as they openly welcomed this revolution.68 
In addition to arguing that the Khmer Rouge had the full support of the Cambodian 
people, Caldwell also predicts that the regime will have a positive impact in the future.  In 
“Cambodia: Rationale for a Rural Policy,” Caldwell highlights the success of the Khmer Rouge, 
explaining that the Cambodian people are in a much better place than they were a few years 
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prior, when wars in Indochina were devastating the country.69  However, this idea is highly 
controversial, primarily because the majority of Caldwell’s research is drawn from statements 
and speeches made by members of the Khmer Rouge, rather than first-hand accounts made by 
survivors and witnesses.  Therefore, the evidence that Caldwell uses does not allow him to 
conclude that disturbing events were taking place at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.  Instead, he 
is only able to see the revolution through the eyes of Pol Pot and his followers.  Caldwell argues 
that the evidence he chose to use was the only reliable source available regarding the Khmer 
Rouge.  First-hand accounts, such as those used by Barron, Paul, Ponchaud and others, are 
unquestionably false and unproven due to their reliance on survivors and witnesses, who 
historically manipulate, exaggerate, and simply do not tell the truth.70 
 Similar to Caldwell, anti-war activists Gareth Porter and George C. Hildebrand are also 
supporters of the Khmer Rouge.  In their jointly authored book, Cambodia: Starvation and 
Revolution, Porter and Hildebrand explain the events that were beginning to unfold in Cambodia.  
Although the authors claim to be setting the record straight, many scholars argue that Porter and 
Hildebrand tend to distort evidence, which was originally factual, to favor the Khmer Rouge.71  
Unlike Caldwell, Porter and Hildebrand base many of their conclusions off of witness and 
survivor stories, which mysteriously express Pol Pot’s good intentions and the ease of his 
revolution.  For example, Porter and Hildebrand assert that evidence suggests that there were no 
crimes being committed against civilians living in Cambodia.  They also argue that Pol Pot’s 
mass evacuation of Phnom Penh to the rural countryside was painless and necessary.  These 
evacuations were only for the good of the Cambodian people, as Phnom Penh and other large 
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cities were grossly overpopulated, had major health and famine crises, and were very susceptible 
to internal disaster.  Therefore, by moving people to the open countryside, Pol Pot was 
supposedly moving them away from several hazards and closer to vital resources like food and 
clean water.72   
Porter and Hildebrand contend that this mass movement of civilians from the cities to the 
countryside was not at all similar to the “death march” portrayed by the U.S. media.73  During 
this evacuation, which eye witnesses supposedly claim was set at a “comfortable pace,” most of 
those returned to the countryside were from there to begin with.74  Still, Porter and Hildebrand 
assert that original city-dwellers were taken to the countryside to avoid the hazards of the cities 
and also to be used as labor to help produce food and resources for the country’s sustenance.75  
Therefore, Pol Pot had good intentions despite the fact that they led to destruction.  In contrast, 
David Chandler also addresses Pol Pot’s motives to evacuate Phnom Penh; although he claims 
that the real reason Pol Pot evacuated the capital city was to rid his party of any and all 
opposition, so that the public was oblivious to the political changes that were occurring.76  
In supporting the regime, Porter and Hildebrand also argue that the outside perception of 
the Khmer Rouge is twisted as a result of the U.S. media: “What was portrayed as a destructive, 
backward-looking policy motivated by doctrinaire hatred was actually a rationally conceived 
strategy for dealing with the urgent problems that faced postwar Cambodia.”77  Accordingly, 
they argue that the U.S. media was able to successfully cover the destruction that the U.S. 
inflicted on Cambodia, because they “avoided the subject of the death and devastation caused by 
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the U.S. intervention in Cambodia, [and] they have gone to great lengths to paint a picture of a 
country ruled by irrational revolutionaries.”78  Chomsky and Herman supported Porter and 
Hildebrand’s ideas, stating that the authors had “presented a carefully documented study of the 
destructive American impact on Cambodia and the success of the Cambodian revolutionaries in 
overcoming it, giving a very favorable picture of their programs and policies.”79 
Debating the Khmer Rouge’s Crimes 
Despite the debated innocence of the Khmer Rouge and the role of the U.S. media in 
exposing the regime’s actions to the American public, overwhelming evidence makes it difficult 
to deny the fact that nearly two million Cambodians were killed as a result of Pol Pot’s regime.  
Over the past two decades, the international community has started pushing Cambodia to 
establish tribunals to finally put the leaders of the Khmer Rouge on trial for their actions.  
Nevertheless, scholars who agreed that members of the regime should be punished then began to 
debate whether these mass fatalities should be termed genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
mass murder according to international law. 
On January 7, 1979, almost four years after the Khmer Rouge began their reign of terror, 
Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia, overthrew Khmer Rouge leadership, and established their 
own government under Hun Sen.80  The People’s Revolutionary Tribunal was created and trials 
soon began in an attempt to convict the Khmer Rouge leaders of genocide.81  Although all who 
were tried were convicted, these convictions were considered illegitimate because they were 
unfair, did not assume the innocence of the defendants, and technically violated international 
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law.82  Instead, Cambodia should have referred to international law during these trials because in 
1951, the country ratified a definition of genocide that was provided by the 1948 United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG).  In Article II 
of this document, the Convention asserted that genocide must be an “act committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.”83  Therefore, because 
of a technicality, this definition does not include the killings of neither political nor majority 
groups.  As a result, scholars remain engulfed in a debate about whether the mass killings in 
Cambodia can constitute genocide under this international law.  Scholars also debate who exactly 
should be tried and what type of tribunal—domestic or international—should be used to 
prosecute these Khmer Rouge leaders. 
Genocide 
Ben Kiernan and Hurst Hannum, a professor of international law with a focus on human 
rights, are two scholars who believe that Khmer Rouge forces committed genocide as defined by 
international law.  Both scholars extrapolate their evidence from the racism and specific targeting 
of ethnic and religious minority groups living in Cambodia—including Chinese, Vietnamese, 
Thai, and Cham—even though both scholars recognize that ethnic Khmer and Buddhist majority 
groups were also killed in large numbers.  Accordingly, CPPCG’s narrow definition of genocide 
only considers the mass killings of minority groups to be genocidal; consequently, Kiernan and 
Hannum argue that because minority groups were one of Pol Pot’s many targets, the killings can 
still be judged as genocide.84 
                                                 
82
 Luftglass, “Crossroads in Cambodia,” 903. 
83
 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, Article II. 
84
 Hurst Hannum, “International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence,” Human Rights Quarterly 
11, no. 1 (February 1989): 95. 
23
 
Kiernan builds on this theory of genocide by arguing that Pol Pot was driven specifically 
by “communism and racism.”85  He not only targeted certain minority groups, but also targeted 
the majority ethnic Khmer political groups that opposed him (or so he thought).86  Pol Pot also 
specifically targeted many groups living in proximity to the Vietnamese and Thai borders 
because he believed that people living in those regions were disloyal and likely to turn on him.  
Kiernan argues that this also constitutes the intent to exterminate a minority group, because Pol 
Pot was specifically targeting these isolated groups living in particular regions of Cambodia.87  
Therefore, although political and majority groups do not fit within CPPCG’s definition of 
genocide, Kiernan argues that there is still sufficient evidence to convict Khmer Rouge leaders of 
genocide.88   
Kiernan agrees with scholar Jean Lacouture, who argues for a theory that he termed 
“auto-genocide.”89  Lacouture defines this idea of auto-genocide as “invented” by the Khmer 
Rouge, because it involves the killings of one’s own national group, even if they are an ethnic, 
political, or religious majority.90  William A. Schabas agrees with Lacouture and states, “since 
[auto-genocide] constitutes the intentional destruction of part of a national group, it meets the 
Convention definition [of genocide].”91  Consequently, due to the severity of their crimes, the 
Khmer Rouge should then be held responsible to the fullest extent of international law, as “we 
are seeing the suicide of a people in the name of revolution—worse, in the name of socialism.”92 
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Crimes Against Humanity and Mass Murder 
Henri Locard offers a similar theory to that of Lacouture, although he believes what 
occurred in Cambodia can be termed “‘politicide,’ rather than ‘genocide.’”93  Politicide, 
according to Locard, is the extermination of an opposing political group.  Therefore, in the case 
of the Khmer Rouge, they were killing only those who opposed their political revolution, namely 
those associated with Lon Nol’s previous government and those who did not fully support the 
revolution.94  Locard argues, however, that the demographic of people killed does not legally 
allow the term genocide to be used, because no specific ethnic, racial, or religious group was 
singled out.  Therefore, Khmer Rouge forces should be tried for crimes against humanity or mass 
murder.95 
Similar to Locard, Stephen Marks, a human rights scholar, argues that according to 
international law, Khmer Rouge leaders can only be prosecuted for genocide.  If genocide cannot 
be proven, prosecution will be difficult.  Therefore, Marks argues that the Khmer Rouge should 
be tried for crimes against humanity or mass murder for the specific targeting and killing of 
minority groups, which are lesser, but still legitimate charges.96  Similarly, Beth van Schaack, an 
international law professor, argues that due to the CPPCG’s “blind spot,” or exclusion of 
majority and political groups in the Convention’s definition, Khmer Rouge leaders cannot be 
held legally responsible for genocide and must be charged with lesser crimes.97 
Howard J. De Nike, John B. Quigley and Kenneth Jay Robinson argue that while many 
scholars assert that Pol Pot’s intentional targeting of religious and ethnic minority groups are all 
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included under the legal definition of genocide, there is no substantial evidence to prove that 
these groups were singled out among the rest of the Khmer and Buddhist majority, who were 
also killed in large numbers.  As a result, they argue that the regime had no intentions of killing 
certain people within the country of Cambodia.  Although minorities were killed, they were not 
singled out, and were only part of Pol Pot’s ordered torture and killing rampage.98 
Tribunal Setup and Administration 
 Putting the Khmer Rouge leaders on trial opens up an entirely new debate among 
scholars about how the tribunals should be set up and administered, as some believe this process 
must involve the United Nations and others believe that Cambodia should preside over their own 
domestic tribunals.  First, it is important to note that it is widely acknowledged that the 
Cambodians themselves have not been actively pushing for any sort of tribunal—international or 
domestic—even though most would still like to see one take place.  Duncan McCargo believes 
that many Cambodians are hesitant of a trial because they assume it will be “substandard,” will 
not carry out justice in the way they intend, and they are unsure of exactly which Khmer Rouge 
participants will be prosecuted (only top Khmer Rouge leaders or everybody who participated in 
the crimes of the Khmer Rouge?).99 
 Nearly thirty years after the Khmer Rouge was finally overthrown, Cambodia finally 
asked the United Nations for help in creating a tribunal to try former members of the regime.  
Although this was a step in the right direction, it took nearly five more years for the two entities 
to finally come to an agreement regarding the structure of the tribunal, primarily because of 
disagreements over which body would possess a majority influence in the outcome of the 
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trials.100  In previous decades, the United Nations had also helped to administer tribunals in 
countries such as Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and East Timor.101 
 A Domestic Tribunal 
The overwhelming sentiment of scholars worldwide is that a domestic, Cambodian-run 
tribunal would not give proper justice to Cambodians, which is the primary reason for 
conducting trials in the first place.102  Stephen Marks debates both the pros and cons of having a 
domestic versus international tribunal.  On the one hand, Marks argues that there is an advantage 
to having domestic trials.  This would allow for better evidence, such as local survivor stories, to 
be used, local law would come into play, and the majority of Cambodians would be in favor of 
this tribunal.  However, Marks counters his own argument by stating that a Cambodian tribunal 
would be insufficient and incapable of justly prosecuting these defendants, specifically due to 
corruption, Khmer Rouge cadres who are still in power in Cambodia, and an already inadequate 
legal system.  As a result, Marks, as well as the majority of academia, assert that it is in the best 
interest of Cambodians to allow for an international tribunal presided over by the United Nations 
to properly prosecute leaders of the Khmer Rouge.103 
An International Tribunal 
The majority of scholars argue for an international hybrid tribunal, consisting of both 
Cambodian and United Nations officials.  The main reason for supporting this idea is that 
questions still remain over whether Cambodian judges, who were campaigning to hold a majority 
influence over international judges, would be fair in their administration of justice, as it has been 
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widely acknowledged that Cambodia’s criminal justice system is inadequate.104  On top of being 
inadequate, the Cambodian judiciary is extremely corrupt, as many judges and government 
officials were previously or are currently tied to the Khmer Rouge.  For example, “since 1979, 
Cambodian judges have been appointed, and their tenure ensured, on the basis of loyalty to the 
ruling party, rather than on fealty to the standards of the legal profession.”105  Therefore, judges 
appointed during Khmer Rouge rule could potentially still maintain this loyalty during trials.  As 
a result of these weaknesses within the Cambodian government, many scholars argue that 
allowing Cambodian officials to have a majority influence during the trials defeats the purpose of 
collaboration with the United Nations.106 
Michael Lieberman is one scholar who believes that the United Nations should enforce 
an international hybrid tribunal for Cambodia.107  In a hybrid tribunal, international and domestic 
judges and counsel are used, “combining the expertise and integrity of international personnel 
with the ownership, accessibility, and perceived legitimacy of a trial staffed by nationals in the 
place of the atrocities.”108  Therefore, Lieberman argues that Cambodian officials in a hybrid 
tribunal will be better capable of rendering justice because international personnel will keep 
them in check and corruption affecting the outcome of the trials is unlikely.109 
Additionally, the academic community widely supports the idea that the United Nations 
should set up a permanent International Criminal Court to be used in Cambodia and also similar 
future cases.110  For example, there have been numerous war crimes tribunals throughout the 
world over the past few decades, such as those that were used in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra 
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Leone, Kosovo, and East Timor, to name a few.  If an International Criminal Court were finally 
set up, there would be no need to endure years of debate regarding tribunals, at which time many 
of the most brutal offenders could die or become extremely old.111  Finally, in 2002, the United 
Nations did successfully ratify an International Criminal Court  (ICC), which by definition will 
“combat impunity or gross violations of international law, including war crimes, genocide, and 
other crimes against humanity.”112  Cambodia was one of the countries that ratified the ICC to 
allow for its existence, although it cannot be used in the case of Cambodia because the Khmer 
Rouge crimes occurred prior to the ICC’s establishment.113 
Who should be put on Trial? 
Besides debating over the charges to bring against Khmer Rouge members during trial, it 
is also important to determine exactly what members of the Khmer Rouge will be tried for their 
crimes.  Duncan McCargo argues that one of the many hesitations that Cambodians have about 
the trials is that they are unsure of exactly who will be prosecuted (only top Khmer Rouge 
leaders or everybody who participated in the crimes of the Khmer Rouge?).  This question is 
answered differently among various scholars, as some believe that only select leaders should be 
prosecuted, while others argue that every person who participated in the crimes of the Khmer 
Rouge must face trial.  Trying to prosecute every person who participated in the events of the 
Khmer Rouge would be problematic, primarily because this would be impossible to determine 
and enforce.  McCargo argues that many Cambodians, specifically those who are educated, feel 
that lines are blurred between those who are the Khmer Rouge masterminds, killers, and current 
government figures who used to be Khmer Rouge cadres.  As a result, it is important to 
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Cambodians that they know exactly who will be prosecuted and what they will be prosecuted for 
once trials begin.114 
Top Khmer Rouge Leaders 
 Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge tribunal law states that only “senior leaders of Democratic 
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes” can be prosecuted.115  Stephen 
Heder and Ben Kiernan are two scholars who support this statement.  Both scholars argue that 
the trials should consist of only top Khmer Rouge leaders, such as Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu 
Samphan, Nuon Chen, Ta Mok, and Kaing Kek Ieu, although it is important to note that Pol Pot 
has since passed away.  Heder and Kiernan argue that if more than just the most prominent 
leaders are put on trial, it will be too difficult to make a distinction as to who should and should 
not be tried due to lack of resources and specific evidence to associate with each individual.116  
Furthermore, Craig Etcheson also supports prosecuting only top Khmer Rouge leaders for two 
reasons.  First, prosecution of only a handful of perpetrators will maintain political stability and 
cohesiveness in Cambodia.  Second, the United Nations will benefit from prosecuting a small 
number of individuals because it will keep their costs relatively low.117 
All Khmer Rouge Participants 
 Another group of scholars contend that the distinction between who is a “senior leader” 
of the Khmer Rouge and who carried out those leaders’ orders remains somewhat ambiguous 
under Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge tribunal law.  Consequently, Tom Fawthrop and Helen Jarvis 
argue that the trials should include a broad range of Khmer Rouge associates, extending well 
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beyond known leaders.118  This is because if only top leaders are prosecuted, thousands of 
participants of the Khmer Rouge, such as those who tortured and executed tens of thousands of 
victims in prison camps, will continue to walk free and will never face the appalling reality of 
their crimes.  Only those who gave the final orders will be facing the reality of what they did, 
which is not fair to the Cambodian people.119  However, despite disagreements over how to 
structure the tribunals and who should be tried, there is a general consensus among scholars that 
some type of tribunal must be put in place because it is absolutely necessary that justice be 
served. 
The Current Situation 
 In 2001, the Cambodian National Assembly passed a law to create the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period 
of Democratic Kampuchea, better known as ECCC.  The purpose of the ECCC was to preside 
over the trials of Khmer Rouge leaders.  Then in June 2003, after many years of disagreements, 
Cambodia and the United Nations finally agreed to proceed with the trials using a hybrid/mixed 
tribunal, which incorporated both Cambodian and United Nations officials.  The United Nations 
still was not overly satisfied though, because Cambodian officials would hold a five to four 
majority over international judges, essentially having the final say in all verdicts.  As I 
previously stated, the government of Cambodia is still infiltrated with many Khmer Rouge 
associates and sympathizers, and therefore it is believed that the Cambodian majority will “likely 
spare the most major figures.”120  It has been reported that many Cambodians are unhappy with 
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this outcome, mainly because the Cambodian majority influence will not allow the trial to “meet 
international standards of fairness and impartiality.”121 
 In conclusion, Cambodia’s situation can be attributed to numerous different factors 
throughout the country’s history.  Since the eighteenth century, Cambodia has been constantly 
fought over and sometimes even occupied by the countries of Vietnam, Thailand, France, and 
Japan.  Although Cambodia finally gained their independence, the need for a new government 
led to the rise of Communism, and ultimately the rise of Pol Pot.  When Pol Pot officially took 
power in 1975, he began a four-year torture and killing rampage, killing nearly two million 
people and affecting the lives of millions more.  During and after this period, scholars began 
forming conclusions about the intentions, motives, and appropriate process of justice to condemn 
the actions of the Khmer Rouge.  These conclusions were often based on the evidence in which 
the scholar chose to use.  For example, scholars using first-hand accounts of survivors and 
witnesses generally denounce the Khmer Rouge, while those using documents created by the 
Khmer Rouge often defend the regime.  Many of these scholars continue to agree and disagree 
with one another, forming an academic environment that is hostile and often contradictory.  
Despite these disagreements, it has largely been agreed on that atrocities did occur at the hands 
of the Khmer Rouge.  Most importantly, trials are finally underway to give justice to the people 
of Cambodia. 
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